I. Introduction
Quantitative analysis on the economic effects and trends of trade liberalization has been both frequent and sophisticated. Vast quantities of easily accessible aggregate data, including multiple countries' trade volumes, average tariff levels, and gross domestic product, are available to economists from governmental or private sources. Perhaps due to the difficulty in obtaining quantitative data on legal phenomena related to the operation of the different international trade regimes, legal scholarship has scarcely used statistical analysis. This means that we have come to understand a good deal about the broad quantifiable economic consequences of trade agreements, but remain largely confined to anecdotal accounts of how such agreements have affected and been impacted by the legal proceedings taking place in the domestic and international legal infrastructure. 1 Thus, studying what can be quantified in the operation of this legal architecture is critical for an understanding of how international trade law has evolved as it has been applied by the institutions charged with adjudicating international trade disputes. This effort may also contribute to a more complete comprehension of the processes underlying economic change.
The United States, like Canada and nearly every other industrialized nation, maintains "trade remedy" laws that authorize U.S. administrative agencies to impose duties on imported goods they find to be "dumped" or subsidized. These anti-dumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) determinations are subject to review by U.S. federal courts. Chapter 19 of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) and its successor, 2 the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), allowed replacing review of agency decisions by national judges on trade remedy cases with review by binational panels appointed jointly by the governments involved.
3 Chapter 19 requires these binational panels to review agency decisions on AD and CVD law using the same standard of review and substantive law as would the domestic courts they replace. 4 NAFTA also prohibits domestic judicial review once one of the members requests the formation of a panel, and requires members to obey the decisions of these panels. 5 The U.S. and Canadian governments adopted this arrangement as a compromise after the United States rejected Canada's demands that CUSFTA eliminate all anti-dumping and countervailing duties in trade between the two countries. 6 Canadians reasoned that this new mechanism for review of agency decisions would put a check on what they perceived as a predisposition on the part of U.S. agencies to rule in favor of U.S. industry petitioners. 7 Prior studies of Chapter 19 agree that these panels overturn U.S. agency decisions more often than U.S. judges. Yet, none of these studies has provided an actual empirical comparison of how review has been different under these two systems. This article reviews prior research and extends it by comparing the results of review of U.S. agency determinations with Chapter 19 review.
II. Operation of U.S. Trade Remedy Law
The AD and CVD law in the United States is a complex set of statutes designed to ensure that the executive branch takes action against unfair standard has been interpreted to be the equivalent of asking: Is the determination unreasonable? 18 In the majority of cases, when deciding whether an agency's decision is "not in accordance with law," a court will provide some deference to the agency's legal interpretations, upholding them unless they are "effectively precluded by the statute. 'n, 718 F.2d 365, 381 (Fed. Cir. 1983 ) (Nies, J., concurring)). 19 PPG Indus. v. United States, 928 F.2d 1568 , 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1991 Rep. No. 100-509, at 3, 8 (1988) . export market, ranking only behind Japan. 25 To Canada, improved access to the largest consumer market in the world-combined with the increase in U.S. and other foreign direct investment that normally follows the creation of a free trade area-provided a number of benefits, including the long-term permanence in Canada of Canadian and foreign-owned multinational corporations (MNCs).
26 From a U.S. perspective, the FTA would, among other things, ensure an open investment environment in Canada for U.S. companies, and facilitate U.S. access to vast Canadian energy resources. 27 Chapter 19 was later extended to Mexico when it entered into the NAFTA in 1994.
28
To implement a more closely integrated dispute settlement regime for trade remedy investigations in the NAFTA area, members agreed to waive their sovereign right to have their agency determinations be reviewed by their domestic courts, opting instead for review by binational panels.
29
Agency compliance with its country's domestic trade remedy laws, as determined by these binational panels, would be the measure of that country's compliance with its NAFTA obligations. 30 Thus, parties from NAFTA countries affected by U.S. trade remedy determinations were given the option to seek either U.S. judicial or Chapter 19 panel review. 31 However, a request for the formation of a binational panel by any party who took part in the agency proceedings forecloses U.S. court review of such determinations. 
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Colares Panels, which consist of "experts" in international trade matters (usually lawyers in private practice), are bound to apply the domestic law of the party whose agency order is challenged, that is, the law of the importing country. 33 More importantly, as reviewing authorities, NAFTA panels must apply "the standard of review . . . and the general legal principles that a court of the importing party otherwise would apply to" determinations of the competent agencies in the importing country.
34 Therefore, NAFTA panels reviewing Commerce or ITC trade remedy decisions are bound to (1) apply U.S. trade remedy law; and (2) employ the statutorily mandated standard of review and assume a level of deference similar to that extended to such agencies by the CIT and the CAFC.
35
In contrast to the U.S. judicial review system where the U.S. federal courts of appeal have no discretion to refuse appeals of final determinations from lower courts, 36 there is no appeal as a matter of right from a panel decision. Under NAFTA, only governments can file a request for an "extraordinary challenge" to a panel decision. 37 Extraordinary Challenge Committees (ECCs) exist partly to ensure that NAFTA decisions remain consistent with domestic law and precedent, 38 but are permitted only in relatively extreme circumstances. For example, a government can file an extraordinary challenge if a panelist is guilty of "gross misconduct," or the panel "manifestly exceeded its powers, authority or jurisdiction . . . for example by failing to apply the appropriate standard of review," but even then only if 33 Id.; NAFTA, supra note 2, Annex 1901.2(1)- (2) -2003 -1904 -01USA, at ¶ 29 (Oct. 7, 2004 ) (ECC should not permit "formation of two streams of anti-dumping and countervail duty law, one developed by binational panels and one by courts; a result that is clearly antithetical to the whole construct of Chapter 19"). Cf. Synthetic Baler Twine with a Knot Strength of 200 Lbs. or Less Originating in or Exported from the United States of America, No. CDA-94-1904 -02, at 12 (Apr. 10, 1995 (binational panel should use same standard of review as Canadian federal court, even though binational panels are particularly expert in international law, to ensure "certainty, consistency, and predictability in decision-making" between decisions involving NAFTA and non-NAFTA members). 40 They all have noted that Chapter 19 panels overturn agency decisions more often than the U.S. courts. 41 Most consider this a desirable outcome or at least one permissible under U.S. law.
42 Some studies have also compared how Chapter 19 panels review U.S. and Canadian agency decisions. They have concluded that Chapter 19 panels have showed far more deference to Canadian decisions, and have ruled more often in favor of petitioners from Canada. 43 None of these studies, however, has systematically looked at the outcomes of all Chapter 19 decisions during both CUSFTA and NAFTA periods. They relied either on data available from the CUSFTA & Pol. 269 (1991) . 41 Id. 42 See Macrory, supra note 40, at 18; Jones, supra note 40, at 149; Pan, supra note 40, at 442-44; Goldstein, supra note 40, at 562; Mercury, supra note 40, at 527-28; Lowenfeld, supra note 40, at 338. 43 See, e.g., Mercury, supra note 40, at 529-35, 568-72; Jones, supra note 40, at 149. 
A. Statement of Hypotheses and Some Methodological Considerations
To empirically verify whether the agreed-upon review mechanism of NAFTA has behaved similarly to the CIT/CAFC review system, I looked at quantifiable aspects of decisions by these parallel adjudicatory systems. To confirm or refute the general impression that NAFTA panels have been less deferential to U.S. agency decisions than U.S. courts, I examined AD/CVD rate, scope, and injury decisions before and after review. 44 The goal was to test the following two hypotheses. The foremost purpose of these hypotheses is twofold: (1) to allow us to look at agency deference from a neutral, nonsubjective perspective; and (2) to monitor the impact of NAFTA or judicial review on these agencies' original determinations. In applying U.S. trade remedy statutory law, Commerce and the ITC issue determinations that either establish or deny the imposition of AD/CVD remedies to imports deemed to be within the scope of their investigations. From both legal and economic perspectives, these 44 To simplify sentences and facilitate the flow of text in this section, when I use the term "rate(s)," the reader should understand that I may also be referring to decisions about the scope of an order. For substantive, not textual, reasons explained in the text below, injury determinations are also subsumed under the general label "rates." 45 Technically, " [t] he hypothesis that is actually tested is . . . the null hypothesis," which generally states that "there is no difference between [the two] groups [studied] or relationship between the variables . . .." Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., Social Statistics 156 (McGraw Hill, rev. 2d ed. 1979) . Accordingly, in this study, the "null" states that there is no difference between the two review systems under any of these research hypotheses. decisions about duty rates or scope (Commerce) and injury (ITC) constitute the core of these agencies' determinations. Examining what happens to the quantifiable dimensions of such decisions once judicial or NAFTA review is completed allows us not only to test empirically whether these two systems have approached agency decisions similarly, but also permits assessment of the overall impact of judicial or NAFTA review on these decisions.
To accomplish these goals, the first hypothesis tests specifically whether original AD/CVD rate determinations by U.S. agencies have the same "success" rate under the two review systems. By looking at whether the final results of either type of review maintain or alter the original agency decision-by reference to what happens to the rate after all review is completed-one can develop a picture of how often agency findings (whether affirmative or negative) receive deference. For our purposes, an agency "win" is either an outright affirmance by the CIT or NAFTA panel or an affirmance of a determination on remand that leaves the original rate undisturbed. Conversely, a "loss" occurs whenever the rate changes as a result of review. Assuming ceteris paribus conditions, if one detects statistically significant differences in the way the two adjudicatory systems approach agency decisions under review, one can then identify one of these two systems as being systematically less deferential than the other.
Looking at a subset of these cases, the data collected under the second hypothesis help us determine what happens to rates when an agency is reversed. This hypothesis notably excludes cases where agencies have "won," as explained in the first hypothesis. By examining how rates change as a result of review, we attempt to detect whether a particular statistically significant trend in the direction of rates exists. Specifically, when we exclude cases where rates remain the same after review, do these adjudicatory systems differ in terms of trends in postreview rates in such a way that one tends to reduce or increase rates more than the other? If one of these review systems is more likely to reduce agency-determined AD/CVD rates than the other, then we can consider that particular system to be more beneficial to exporting interests than to the competing domestic industry in the importing country. Thus, by determining that one review system is more likely to increase (or decrease) rates than the other, we should be able to identify which set of economic interests tends to benefit more under each systeman inquiry beyond the notion of deference, tested in the first hypothesis.
In sum, should empirical analysis support these two hypotheses, we would be justified in concluding that binational review under NAFTA has failed to comply with the requirement that it apply the U.S. substantive law
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Colares under the same principles of administrative review that prevail in U.S. courts. Such sustained pattern of adjudication that limits the operation of U.S. trade remedy statutes would amount to a failure to comply with Congress's will and the basic terms of the bargain to which NAFTA members agreed.
B. The Data
To test the two hypotheses, I collected data covering completed results of CIT/CAFC review and NAFTA binational review in the period from January 1, 1989 to December 31, 2005. These results focused on determinations made by the Department of Commerce and the ITC. For CIT/CAFC review, the two main sources of primary data were (1) the U.S. Court of International Trade Reports (1989 Reports ( -1999  46 and (2) the websites of the CIT (1999 CIT ( -2005 , 47 CAFC, and Georgetown Law Library (1995-2005) , which contain all decisions by these courts during the relevant period.
48 Of all CIT/CAFC opinions, I looked only at trade remedy cases, discarding other types of litigation, such as appeals of Customs decisions to the CIT/CAFC and appeals of government contracts, patents, trademarks, and certain money claims against the U.S. government to the CAFC. I also examined the effects of CAFC reversal of CIT decisions. As I looked at each of these decisions, I monitored subsequent developments on remand by looking at agency remand redeterminations according to the case file number assigned at the CIT.
Because the CIT issues on average more than 120 decisions regarding trade remedy determinations every year, I developed an algorithm that restricted the size of the sample to manageable proportions while assuring randomness. This algorithm is based on the last five digits of the case file number assigned at random to all CIT decisions. If the sum of these digits divided by three yields an integer, the case enters the sample. However, if the selected case involves procedural issues (e.g., requests for injunctions, mandamus, motions for rehearing, etc.) not relevant for comparison with 46 United States Court of International Trade Reports: Cases Adjudged in the United States Court of International Trade, vols. 13-23 (1989 Trade, vols. 13-23 ( -1999 NAFTA dispute settlement, that selected case, though part of the sample, will not appear in the total number of observations. I obtained the initial agency rate from the Federal Register notice communicating the results of the agency's final determination or from the court's opinion. To obtain information about what happened to rates when the CIT did not affirm, I searched through the Federal Register database for information about agencies' redeterminations on remand.
49 When I did not succeed in obtaining any information through this means, I contacted the Office of the Clerk of the CIT and requested information about these particular remands. This was particularly necessary for remand redeterminations issued between January 1, 1989 and May 16, 1997, because the Department of Commerce has not published its remand results for this period and in some cases may not retain them. Remand redeterminations for the relevant cases in the remaining period of our sample were obtained from Commerce's website. 50 However, because information about some of these cases was proprietary, I was not granted access to such remands and could not reach a decision with respect to rates for such cases, and thus had to eliminate them from the sample.
Because only 42 completed Chapter 19 cases reviewing U.S. agency determinations occurred during the research period, I was able to collect data on the entire population of published cases before NAFTA panels. Primary data on these Chapter 19 cases were obtained from the NAFTA Secretariat's database of panel and ECC decisions.
51 I also monitored subsequent developments on remand by looking at agency remand redeterminations to determine how prior rate decisions were affected. Information about pre-and post-NAFTA review agency rates was collected from Federal Register notices and the text of NAFTA panel or ECC reports following remand.
Upon completion of data collection, I coded each case for purposes of hypothesis testing. Although detailed information about how cases were coded is presented in the section below, my final decision with respect to where a particular case fits is based on the final outcome of review once all remand activity, if any, was approved by the reviewing body. 
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To include ITC cases within the sample, I developed a method that allowed me to convert review results from injury determinations into a rate-based approach. Because of the binary nature of injury determinations in U.S. trade remedy law, final judicial or NAFTA review of affirmative injury determinations can result in either affirmance or revocation of the underlying AD/CVD duty order.
52 Therefore, an affirmance of an affirmative injury determination was coded as a decision that does not alter the rate, while a final decision vacating or calling for the revocation of a prior affirmative injury determination on remand means that the rate is in effect reduced (i.e., the rate actually disappears) as a result of the order being revoked. Accordingly, final affirmance of a negative injury determination was interpreted as a decision that leaves the rate unchanged (i.e., the rate remains at zero as no order imposing offsetting duties exists), while a court or panelmandated remand that subsequently results in the ITC issuance of an affirmative injury remand redetermination does count as a change in rates, since duty rates will necessarily be imposed, and rates will change from zero upward.
C. Statistical Comparison of Chapter 19 and U.S. Judicial Review Outcomes

First Hypothesis: NAFTA Panel Review is Less Likely to Leave Rate Determinations Unchanged than U.S. Federal Court Review
To test this hypothesis, I looked at whether the rates prevailing after the conclusion of all review remained the same or changed (upward or downward) in comparison with the rates reported at the conclusion of U.S. agency trade remedy investigations. 53 Among the 168 cases in U.S. courts in the sample, 68 percent (114 cases) resulted in no change in the agencydetermined rate after review, while 32 percent (54 cases) resulted in a different rate. In contrast, among the 41 cases reviewed at NAFTA, 34 percent (14 cases) did not change the rate imposed by the agency. Signifi-52 19 U.S.C. § § 1671(a), 1673.
53 That is, rates established in Commerce's original final determinations constitute the baseline for rate comparisons throughout this study. For a number of reasons, not all relevant cases were included in the reported number of observations. An otherwise relevant case was excluded where either (1) the final disposition on review did not occur before December 31, 2005; (2) the information regarding rates after remand was not available, as explained in Section IV.B; or (3) the final disposition of a case, though occurring at a later year, was recorded earlier (to avoid the risk of double-counting).
cantly, NAFTA changed original agency rates 66 percent (27 cases) of the time. Thus, in rounded figures, over two challenges in three fail to succeed in changing U.S. agency rate decisions in U.S. courts. Yet, only one challenge in three at NAFTA fails to change rates. Conversely, U.S. judicial review of agency determinations change rates less than one-third of the time, while review at NAFTA does so just short of two-thirds of the time. 54 These results demonstrate that varying the review system impacts the likelihood that rates will remain the same. To be precise, U.S. judicial review is more deferential to prior agency determinations than NAFTA binational review because it allows the status quo to stand much more frequently.
To determine whether a statistically significant relationship exists between adjudicating system and rate status, I performed a Fisher's exact test. I obtained a p value less than 0.001 (two-tailed), and was able to corroborate the hypothesis that NAFTA panel review is less likely to leave rate determinations unchanged than U.S. federal court review. That the source of review affects whether rates change suggests that U.S. judicial review is more deferential to agency determinations than NAFTA as a result of the principle of judicial deference prevailing in all administrative litigation in U.S. courts.
Second Hypothesis: NAFTA Panel Review is Less Likely to Result in Rate Increases than U.S. Federal Court Review
By examining the subset of decisions where U.S. agencies were reversed, one seeks to determine if the two review systems also differ with respect to the direction that revised rates assume after review is completed. 55 This examination reveals that although both review systems are more likely to decrease than increase rates when they reverse agencies, they differ markedly in terms of how often rates are increased or decreased. When U.S. courts reverse U.S. agencies, their review leads to increased rates about 32 percent (14 of 44 cases) of the time or almost three times for every 10 reversals. NAFTA, on the other hand, does so 8 percent (2 of 25 cases) of the time, or less than once 54 See the Appendix for a list of the cases in which NAFTA review changed rates. Due to the large sample size, I do not provide a list of the CIT/CAFC cases that resulted in changed rates. 55 As with the first hypothesis, not all relevant cases were included in the reported number of observations. In addition to the reasons for exclusion listed in note 53, an otherwise relevant case was excluded where either (1) the rates did not differ from the original rates; or (2) the rates assessed to particular companies changed in opposite directions ("mixed-rate" cases).
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Colares for every 10 reversals. In relative percentages, NAFTA review is thus four times less likely to result in increased rates than U.S. court review. Conversely, after NAFTA review, rates are decreased 92 percent of the time (23 out of 25 cases) compared to only 68 percent of the time (30 of 44 cases) in U.S. federal courts.
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Statistical testing (p value approximately 0.036, two-tailed) confirmed the interpretation above, allowing me to corroborate the hypothesis that NAFTA panel review is less likely to result in rate increases than U.S. federal court review. That NAFTA review is more likely to result in rate decreases than U.S. judicial review supports the earlier inference that NAFTA is more beneficial to exporting interests than to the competing U.S. domestic industry seeking relief against foreign trade practices.
One should note that of the 14 CIT/CAFC reviews that resulted in rate increases, nine were filed by plaintiffs representing the domestic industry.
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To date, such plaintiffs have never initiated a Chapter 19 proceeding (though they have cross-appealed in reaction to importers' appeals). In theory, one could suppose that the difference in outcomes between Chapter 19 and CIT adjudication arises because U.S. industries have neglected to file appeals that would have succeeded if they had bothered to pursue them. But it is hard to imagine why U.S. industries would be relatively more neglectful of their own rights in cases with Chapter 19 jurisdiction than in cases with CIT jurisdiction. In both forums it is relatively cheap to appeal, compared with pursuing an investigation, so that if the expense of filing a petition justified pursuing a matter, the chance of filing an appeal with a good chance of success would seem equally to justify doing so. Thus, the reluctance on the part of U.S. domestic industry to request Chapter 19 review likely results from the perception that its chances of success are low. This perception may be based on commentators who have observed different success rates 58 and the history of Chapter 19, which was introduced as a result of Canadian complaints that the CIT did not give Canadian parties a sufficient chance of success. 56 See the Appendix for a list of cases where NAFTA review has decreased rates. 57 See the Appendix for a list of CIT/CAFC cases filed by the domestic industry.
58 Supra note 40.
D. Why a Priest-Klein Case Selection Effect Cannot Account for the Results of Chapter 19 Litigation
Priest and Klein posited that samples consisting only of litigated cases are not necessarily representative of the larger population of disputes about which one draws causal inferences. 59 In light of this, one may question whether a case selection effect might actually account for the demonstrated propensity of Chapter 19 panels to rule against U.S. agency decisions. If fewer challenges to NAFTA mean only stronger cases are being pursued, the difference in reversal rates between the two systems may be a result of case selection, rather than an indication of less deference in the Chapter 19 system.
Two important facts refute this conjecture. First, from 1989 through 2003 (the most recent year for which statistics on agency orders are available), the United States issued 15 AD/CVD orders on Canadian imports, 60 all of which were appealed to Chapter 19 panels. 61 That Canadian parties chose to challenge every order a U.S. agency issued against their exports shows how unselective they have been with respect to their decisions to appeal. In contrast, since New Steel Rails from Canada in 1990, 62 U.S. industry has not bothered to appeal any negative dumping, subsidy, or injury decision by U.S. agencies regarding Canadian goods, even though appeals typically require Thus, we must examine the rate of U.S. agency wins and losses during the post-Chevron period that preceded the creation of Chapter 19 (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) .
A perfect comparison between the data sets in the two periods is not possible due to lack of information on the status of rates (pre-and postreview), but we can still roughly determine the extent to which U.S. agency decisions were maintained (or changed) by analyzing published court opinions involving Canadian goods in the relevant period. A search of published CIT decisions produced 26 slip opinions involving "nonprocedural" challenges to U.S. agency final determinations on Canadian products in the 1984-1988 period. These 26 decisions occurred on 17 separate cases brought by U.S. domestic industry, U.S. importing industry, or Canadian producers.
Of these 17 cases, the U.S. government won 10 (58.82 percent), with other parties winning 7 (41.18 percent). Although this analysis does not reveal what happened to the rate after court review, it uses U.S. government wins as a proxy for agency affirmance and, therefore, deference. I suspect that if data on rates before and after review were available for this period, some of these cases would result in rates being left ultimately unchanged, since, as we learned from the other sample (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) , not all court reversals lead to rate decreases on remand. Regardless, this means that at least 58 percent of cases resulted in no change in rates. In comparison with the 34.15 percent U.S. agency win rate at NAFTA, this is quite a change. Furthermore, we can now surmise that nonagency parties went from a less than 42 percent win rate before NAFTA to a 66 percent win rate, which is a significant increase. Thus, we can conclude that change in review systems brought a greater agency reversal rate.
Of course, this analysis combines under the label "other parties" Canadian and U.S. plaintiffs (U.S. domestic industry and U.S. importers). Yet, except for a desire to reverse prior agency action, these parties have opposing interests. Therefore, I analyzed these 17 cases according to whether the party who won had a preference to maintain or increase duty rates (U.S. government and U.S. domestic industry), or was attempting to reduce or eliminate these rates altogether (Canadian producer and U.S. importer). Bearing in mind that U.S. agencies won 10 of these cases, if one takes note of the fact that among the seven wins for other parties, three wins are for U.S. domestic industry, one can conclude that pro-rate parties won (at least) 76.47 percent of these pre-NAFTA cases, much above the 23.53 percent win rate for anti-rate parties.
These changes in rates of agency reversal and duty rate reductions show a systemic pattern: far from mirroring preexisting litigation patterns in 188 Colares U.S. judicial review, the switch from CIT adjudication to Chapter 19 review has profoundly altered the general profile of outcomes in favor of Canadian producers and against U.S. agencies and U.S. domestic industry. More importantly, they corroborate the notion that Chapter 19 panels have not behaved like the U.S. courts they replaced.
F. Examining Alternative Causation Explanations
Conceivably, one could argue that the reported differences between the two systems merely reflect a pro-U.S. agency bias in U.S. courts. Therefore, NAFTA results are different because its panels are simply providing a more "correct" interpretation of the law (though this would still mean that NAFTA panels were not fulfilling their mandate to apply U.S. law in the same fashion as the U.S. courts). However, there is reason to think otherwise. 67 If this were true, this conclusion would still have momentous implications. CIT judges are highly qualified U.S. lawyers, who are appointed for life under strict Article III requirements specifically to shield them from political influence. They typically have many years' experience on the bench, where they specialize in trade law. Their decisions are subject to appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, where judges have similar qualifications and experience. Thus, if this arrangement produces outcomes that are dramatically more biased against foreign nationals than do ad hoc panels of part-time judges of mixed legal backgrounds, often with no prior judicial or trade experience or even law degrees, and no regular appellate review, then the entire U.S. system of lifetime judicial appointment needs rethinking.
Additionally, a bias argument simplistically assumes that all U.S. parties-including the agency, the petitioning domestic industry, and the U.S. importers-have homogenous interests. The opposite is true. For example, the domestic industry would want to impose or increase duties while U.S. importers would want to eliminate or decrease them. In turn, the agency has a greater interest in seeing its earlier decisions upheld on appeal regardless of whether they authorized or denied the imposition of AD/CVD duties. Even if domestic producers could control the appointment process to "pack" the CIT with pro-duty judges (assuming U.S. importers do not form as strong a lobby), it would be much more difficult to sustain that level of control over CAFC appointments. This is the case because review of trade law decisions is a smaller part of the CAFC docket than review of other cases, such as patent cases and claims against the U.S. government. Thus, judicial appointments would be made based on considerations other than just the candidate's views regarding trade law.
More importantly, a bias argument simply cannot undermine the CIT/ CAFC's alignment with other federal administrative review. If one takes the data and statistical analysis coming from the CIT/CAFC portion of this study and compares them with the results of general appellate review of agency action in the United States, no discrepancy appears. As Graves and Teske showed, when considering a period that predated Chevron by several years, federal appellate and Supreme Court review of administrative decisions yielded affirmance rates of up to 63 percent, which is not much different from the 68 percent affirmance rate detected in the first hypothesis. 68 If affirmance rates of this magnitude are the norm for agency review proceedings throughout the federal judiciary, one can only conclude that the NAFTA binational review system is not acting like reviewing courts in the United States.
Equally, it is possible that some unknown factual distinction accounts for the difference in outcomes. That is, there could be some unique factor that distinguishes appeals involving Canada from appeals involving other countries. Many papers have used statistical analysis to try to identify factors that influence the outcomes of agency determinations of dumping, subsidization, or injury. 69 For example, many have considered whether factors that are proxies for political influence correlate with outcomes at the ITC or Commerce, generally with inconclusive or negative results. 70 Analysis of these discussions is interesting but falls outside the scope of this article. 71 Unfortunately, no study has similarly tried to analyze factors explaining the outcomes of judicial review of agency decisions in trade cases, which is not the same thing. For example, Blonigen and Brown find that China tends to receive higher anti-dumping margins from Commerce, and Korea, Taiwan, and Russia to have significantly lower ones. 72 But that does not necessarily mean that judicial review is more-or less-likely to overturn Commerce decisions involving China than Korea. These figures, in themselves, do not suggest that Commerce is "biased" against China or in favor of Korea, or that judicial review would reverse those biases, or whether some other factor entirely explains the observed differences in margins (e.g., that the absence of reliable input price data in China's imperfectly market-based economy means that firms tend more frequently to sell below cost and hence dump more frequently). Accordingly, while more research regarding factors influencing court review of trade cases may be useful, there is no currently known factor that would cause the outcome of trade appeals involving Canada to differ from appeals involving other countries, other than different application of standards of review.
VI. Conclusion
A striking feature of the data analyzed above is the sustained asymmetrical pattern of review results between NAFTA and CIT/CAFC adjudication. 70 See Finger, supra note 69 (finding no significant evidence of political influence on Commerce anti-dumping and countervailing duty decisions); Lenway, supra note 69 (finding no significant evidence of political influence on ITC decisions); Hansen & Prusa, supra note 69 (finding that ITC decisions positively correlated with PAC contributions and House Ways & Means Committee representation but non-or negatively correlated with Senate Finance Committee representation); De Vault, supra note 69, at 1, 18 (Congress has "influenced" ITC decisions but not "micromanaged" them). 71 Faced with a potentially infinite number of possible correlations that might be analyzed between potential explanatory variables and observed outcomes of trade cases, it is not necessarily surprising to find some statistically significant positive correlations. Interpretation of the significance of these correlations requires caution. 72 See Blonigen, supra note 69.
